COMMITTEE LANGUAGE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

F-14 SERIES
ACCOUNT: APN

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
223,661	216,361	231,661	224,361	224,361	223,661	216,361

F-14 UPGRADE
ACCOUNT: RDT&E

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
12,947	12,947	12,947	----------	12,947	12,947	----------

HNSC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-532)

(Page 59 - Aircraft Procurement, Navy)
F-14 Modifications

The budget request contained $223.7 million for F 14 modifications, including $81.1 million for structural improvements. The committee notes excessive cost growth related to modifications for structural improvements and, therefore, recommends a decrease of $7.3 million.

(Page 266 - Other Issues)
ADVANCED SELF-PROTECTION JAMMER

The committee notes that the AN/ALQ-165, the Advanced Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ), is one of the most advanced tactical aircraft electronic countermeasures systems in production. Over 530 F/A-18C/D and 50 F-14D aircraft in the Navy and the Marine Corps inventory have been equipped for ASPJ installation, and it is the only electronic countermeasures system installed on these aircraft that can effectively counter the more modern threats encountered worldwide today. However, the committee also notes that out of 131 ASPJ units that have been procured thus far, only 82 systems are currently available for use by the Navy and the Marine Corps. As there is no organic depot capability to maintain the ASPJ systems, all failed systems must be returned to the manufacturer for repairs resulting in the Navy being only able to support approximately four fleet squadrons, or around 48 to 50 aircraft. The committee is also concerned that the lack of a sufficient ASPJ inventory requires that squadrons deploying with the ASPJ must have them installed just prior to deployment or while en route to the deployment areas. This situation precludes sufficient time for either pilot or maintenance personnel to properly train on the ASPJ system to ensure maximum operational proficiency. The committee urges the Secretary of the Navy to fully review all options for improving the availability of the ASPJ system, including the consideration of establishing a logistics support system for ASPJ maintenance and repair. Elsewhere in this report, the committee recommends an increase of $75.0

(Page 567-568)
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JAMES M. TALENT

I write to express my disappointment that the Committee mark included 27 F/A–18E/Fs Super Hornets rather than the 30 aircraft as requested by the Navy for FY 1999. I am confident, however, especially given the outstanding success of this program, that these three aircraft will be restored as we progress through the legislative process.

Over the winter, a handful of print articles attempted to make the case that ''wing drop'' was a major problem for the E/F. This phenomenon, inherent in swept-wing, high-performance fighter air-craft, occurred at a limited number of known points in the flight envelop. It was caused by an imbalance in lift generated across one wing relative to the other. Software modifications eliminated most, but not all, of this undesirable flight characteristic.

From last fall through early April, the Navy's flight test team at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Maryland, followed a systematic, structured test plan that developed a final software/hardware fix to wing drop. During testing as far back as mid December, the Navy was able to report that over a two day period involving 421 at-tempts to actually induce wing drop with hardware applications in place, test pilots noted only two incidents.

During testimony before the House National Security Committee earlier this spring, Secretary Cohen stated that he would not re-lease FY 1998 funding until he was satisfied that wing drop was solved. Leading up to the Secretary's own review, the Navy's solution to wing drop was scrutinized by (1) the Overarching Integrated Product Test Team chaired by George Schneiter in his capacity as Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems; (2) Phil Coyle III, OSD's Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation; (3) John Douglass, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition; (4) Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations; (5) John Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; (6) Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary for Acquisition; and (7) Dr. John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

On April 3, Secretary Cohen endorsed the Test Team's solution for wing drop, and on April 15 released funds for the 20 Super Hornets authorized and funded in FY 1998. Despite the attention paid the issue, the solution to wing drop is nothing more than a piece of sheet stainless steel with thousands of little holes drilled in it to energize airflow over that portion of the wing. The production solution, a simple bolt-on composite panel, simply replaces the old one, and involves no hydraulics, electronics, nor structural modifications.

Having said this, it is important to note the significance as of the Navy's request for 30 aircraft. This issue must be, from the warfighter's perspective, the program's key operational milestone. Specifically, the FY 1999 Navy request procures the first Super Hornets destined for operational use in fleet operations, currently scheduled for deployment aboard Harry S. Truman (CVN–75) in the spring of 2002. These aircraft are meant to replace two aging squadrons of 1970s-vintage F–14A Tomcats. Not merely a question of replacing Tomcats with Super Hornets, in 2002 the average age of these A-model F–14s will exceed 21 years.

There are a number of very good reasons why Secretary Dalton and Admiral Johnson identify the Super Hornet as the Navy's top priority, and why the Navy's leadership has done so for three consecutive years. The E/F's operational capabilities are well know. The CNO has summed up the matter quite well: The Super Hornet ''will dominate every known and anticipated

threat for the next 20 years.'' More than any other single weapons program, the Super Hornet, is the key to America's naval power.

Flight testing is now 72 percent complete, and will be completed in time to begin Operational Evaluation, the next major milestone in May 1999, its scheduled start date. The aircraft is meeting or exceeding its performance in category, and is below weight and under congressional cost caps.

The question before Congress is no longer one of program viability, aircraft performance, or acquisition costs caps. Rather, the issue is one of how best to economically procure E/Fs consistent QDR recommendations and deploy them to the fleet. Given the outstanding success of the pro-gram and the close scrutiny—and endorsement—it has received from the Department, we should authorize the Service to begin negotiations towards a multi-year contract—and the approximately two-thirds of a billion dollars this action will save. One need only look at the difficulties involved in other multi-year contract negotiations to understand that we should support this action now.

JIM TALENT.

SASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-189)

(Page 77 - Aircraft Procurement, Navy)
F-14 pods

The budget request included $223.7 million for F 14 modifications. Included in those modifications is an initiative, called the F 14 precision strike program, to fulfill an urgent fleet requirement to maintain a capacity for long range high payload strike missions in the F-14. The precision strike program makes use of an Air Force developed forward looking infrared (FLIR) pod, called a low altitude navigation and targeting infrared at night (LANTIRN) pod. To lower cost and shorten schedule, the Navy uses the pod as a stand alone sensor.

The committee understands that the incorporation of these nondevelopmental pods could be accelerated, but that constrained funding prevented the most efficient acquisition of the pods and associated test equipment. Accordingly, the committee recommends an addition of $8.0 million to the budget request for that purpose.

(Page 126-127 - Other Items of Interest)
F/A-18E/F configuration mix

The budget request included $2,876.1 million for the procurement of 30 F/A-18E/F aircraft. Among the 30 aircraft, the Navy would buy 14 single seat aircraft (F/A-18E) and 16 two seat aircraft (F/A-18F).

During the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Defense Department reduced the planned buy for F/A-18E/F from 1,000 aircraft to a total of 548 785. The new total would vary, depending upon how soon the joint strike fighter (JSF) enters service. Whatever the size of the program for F/A-18E/F, the total program would now include a greater proportion of the two seat F/A-18F aircraft. One explanation for the richer mix has been that the Navy needs more two seat F/A-18s to replace two seat F-14s that will be retiring.

Following a recent hearing, the committee asked the Navy for a definition and rationale for the force mix between single seat F/A-18E aircraft and F/A-18F aircraft. The committee was very disappointed with the answer provided. Perhaps the Department did not understand the question. The question was: ``Why does the Navy need a two seat aircraft to replace the F-14, when it is contemplating a two seat aircraft F/A-18F to replace the present day EA-6B?" The EA-6B aircraft is a four seat aircraft.

The committee recognizes the large strides made in human factors design of modern cockpits and simplified controls now available in tactical aircraft. The committee is aware that such improvements as digital displays, data links, and other improvements have decreased cockpit workload. For single seat aircraft, a major improvement has come from the development of hands on throttle and stick (HOTAS) flight management systems. HOTAS systems allow pilots to fly tactical aircraft without removing their hands from the flight controls to operate and fight the aircraft system. In fact, the Navy has represented that these technologies will permit the Navy to perform the EA-6B mission in a two seat aircraft. The committee notes that such technologies might permit the Navy to replace some two seat F-14 aircraft with single seat F-18 aircraft. Therefore, the committee needs to understand more of the reasoning behind the Navy's F/A-18E/F force mix. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, no later than February 1, 1999, on the F/A-18E/F mix that includes:

(1) an analysis of crew contribution to mission success in tactical aircraft acquired since 1980, with due consideration given the technology improvements that would allow a single pilot to fly a tactical aircraft and simultaneously operate complex weapons systems;

(2) a comparison of crew workload and mission requirements of single and dual seat tactical aircraft acquired or planned for acquisition from 1980 through 2010; and

(3) a complete description of how a two seat F/A-18F aircraft will be able to perform the missions of the four seat EA 6B;

(4) the planned mix of F/A-18E and F/A-18F aircraft from the fiscal year 1999 budget request through the end of the program;

(5) a complete explanation of why F-14 aircraft must be replaced on a one-for-one basis by F/A-18F aircraft;

(6) a complete analysis of the range differential between the two seat F/A-18F and the single seat F/A-18E that considers reduced fuel for the second seat, increased life cycle costs, and any range degradation associated with wing drop remedies;

(7) an analysis of the intended roles for the single and dual seat F/A-18's highlighting similarities and differences in their roles; and

(8) an analysis of F/A-18 capability shortfalls brought on by network-centered warfare requirements that could require a second crew member.

(Page 174-175 - RDT&E, Navy)
F/A-18E/F reconnaissance development

The budget request included $1.4 million in research and development and $43.2 million in procurement to continue the restructured advanced tactical air reconnaissance system (ATARS) program. The ATARS total program of $464.9 million includes $216.3 million in development and $248.6 million in procurement. The ATARS program will field reconnaissance systems on

Marine Corps F/A-18D aircraft. The approved ATARS plan calls for fielding a total of 31 ATARS systems. The plan was restructured as part of a congressional cancellation of the original the Air Force follow-on tactical reconnaissance system (FOTRS) program. Congress dropped Air Force and Navy participation in the ATARS program specifically because of the inadequate support and oversight provided by the two services.

The budget request also included $2.9 million for fiscal year 1998 and $43.4 million for fiscal year 1999 to begin an F/A-18E/F tactical reconnaissance development within PE 24136N. This is a new start program to develop a replacement for the F-14 tactical air reconnaissance pod system (TARPS). The Navy intends to spend $398.9 million ($112.4 million in research and development and $286.5 million in procurement) to field 50 pods and eight ground stations.

The committee believes that the budget request for tactical reconnaissance is excessive, particularly in view of other alternatives that may be available to solve the Navy's tactical reconnaissance needs. Therefore, the committee recommends a funding level of $20.0 million for F/A-18E/F tactical reconnaissance development, a reduction of $23.4 million.

The committee believes that the Navy must conduct an analysis of alternatives (AOA) before launching upon a program that would spend another $400.0 million on providing a TARPS replacement, when a direct one-for-one replacement may not be the most effective solution to the problem. The AOA should consider reconnaissance capability to be provided by other planned or existing systems, such as carrier-capable Marine Corps F/A-18D aircraft, various unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and a range of national reconnaissance systems. The committee directs the Navy to obligate no more than 50 percent of these funds until 30 days after the Navy submits the results of the AOA to the congressional defense committees.

CASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-736)

(Page 409 and 410)
Title I - Procurement
F–14 Series

The budget request included $223.7 million for the F–14 Series aircraft.

The House bill would authorize a decrease of $7.3 million due to excessive cost growth related to structural improvements.

The Senate amendment would authorize an increase of $8.0 million for acceleration of the precision strike upgrade.

The conferees agree to authorize an increase of $0.7 million to accelerate the precision strike upgrade, and believe that the Department of Defense can meet requirements for structural improvements within the provided amount.

HAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-591)

(Page 123 - Aircraft Procurement, Navy)
F–14 SERIES

The Navy requested $223,661,000 for F–14 aircraft modifications. The Committee recommends $224,361,000, an increase of $700,000. This includes an increase of $8,000,000 for LANTIRN and a decrease of $7,300,000 as recommended in the House-passed authorization bill. The Chief of Naval Operations identified the lack of LANTIRN equipment as a serious deficiency. The additional funds will procure the last LANTIRN system needed to meet fleet inventory objectives and support equipment needed to effectively operate deployed LANTIRN systems.

(Page 213 - 214 - RDT&E, Operational Systems Development)
SHARED RECONNAISSANCE POD

The Committee strongly supports the Navy's Shared Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) program and is pleased that the Navy has decided to meet its 15-year old, manned tactical reconnaissance requirement with a reconnaissance pod employing state-of-the-art imagery technologies. However, the Committee is concerned with an apparent decision by the Chief of Naval Operations to not support this program in future year budgets. This is disturbing particularly when considering the successful demonstration of the F–14 Tactical Airborne Reconnaisance Podded System (TARPS) Completely Digital (CD) on June 2, 1998. The display clearly demonstrated modern off-the-shelf electro-optic (EO) framing technologies employed in a reconnaissance pod.

Moreover, the Committee agrees with the Navy's stated position that SHARP will provide superior imagery more cost effectively than the older Advanced Tactical Air Reconnassiance System (ATARS) technology. The Committee believes the most prudent ex-penditure of limited funding is on modern imagery technologies that provide our troops the greatest opportunity for mission success, minimizing crew and aircraft exposure to hostile action and allowing for flexible employment on multiple aircraft types. SHARP provides these qualities and capabilities. Therefore, the Committee strongly recommends that the Navy include the SHARP program in future budgets.

(Page 289)
DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. DAVE OBEY

The Committee has once again produced a military spending bill directing substantial sums for lower priority items, while short-changing several programs important to our national security. In particular, the Nunn-Lugar reduction program and the Navy's number one budget priority to replace aging F–14's with new F/A–18 E/F aircraft have been cut to make room for other items. This bill is filled with congressional directed spending projects selected more on the basis of whose district the money will be spent in rather than how the product will be used by our fighting forces.

Further, this bill clearly demonstrates that the Republican leadership has not been genuine in its advocacy of strict budget discipline and holding down government spending. They have taken a number of steps that appear to be at variance with the recommendations of the Budget Committee and its chairman, and seem to show that they want to make spending decisions on an ad hoc basis rather than in conformance with an overall budget plan. Ultimately this means that each spending decision, whether it is for highways, weapons procurement, or some other recently rediscovered priority is made on an ad hoc basis in the same way Congress operated prior to the 1974 Budget Act.

One of the most remarkable aspects of this National Security Appropriations bill is that a selected amount of outlays from certain accounts will be scored on the basis calculated by OMB instead of by CBO (so-called ''directed scoring''). What this means is that the House Republican leadership chose to ignore the professional judgment of the CBO on how to account for the spending in this bill. The result is to simply not count billions in military spending that the CBO determined should be counted.

Just two-and-a-half years ago this same Republican leadership even went so far as to shut down the government over its insistence that the President and the Congress use no other spending assumptions than those made by the CBO. What a difference two-and-a-half years have made.

Besides relying on the Speaker's ''directed scoring'' order that CBO simply not count billions in military spending, this bill employs two other ways to spend another $1.93 billion more than would be technically counted against the defense budget caps enacted into law by the Balanced Budget Act. Legislative language has been inserted to shift the accounting of asset sales of surplus Navy ships to allow the Pentagon to re-spend the proceeds, and two appropriations in the bill were designated to be ''emergency'' items, thereby excluding them from the official bill totals.

When all the accounting gimmicks are pushed aside and the real spending in this bill is added up, we find that it spends nearly $4.4 billion more for fiscal year 1999 then called for under the Balanced Budget outlay cap (embodied in the 302b outlay allocation) enacted by Congress less than a year ago.

SAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-200)

(Page 62 - Aircraft Procurement, Navy)

Common ECM equipment.—The Committee understands the acute shortage of ALQ–165 electronic warfare jamming devices has left the Department of the Navy without adequate numbers to support deploying F–14D's and F/A–18C/D's. The Marine Corps F/A–18's have only three suites remaining and some overseas deploying Navy squadrons will remain unprotected against specific threats the ALQ–165 counters for nearly 4 months. Therefore, the Committee has provided an increase of $10,000,000 for the procurement of 18 ALQ–165 suites. Additionally, the Committee directs the Department of the Navy to develop a program for fiscal year 2000 and beyond which fully satisfies the requirements of its deploying forces during the interim period until IDECM is fully operational.

CAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-746)

(Page 115-116 – Aircraft Procurement, Navy – Explanation of Project Level Adjustments)

[In thousands of dollars]

	Budget	House	Senate	Conference
F–14 SERIES	223,661	224,361	223,661	216,361
LANTIRN	0	8,000	0	0
Authorization reduction, structural mods	0	–7,300	0	–7,300